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CHAPTER 3 
I 
Workmen's Compensationl Law 
LAURENCE S. LOCKE* I 
§3.1. Personal Injury: Application of Successive Jnsurer Rule to 
Dissimilar and Unrelated Injuries: Effect of Lump Sum Settlement 
of Later Injury: Double Recovery. In Carrier's Cas~ 1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court confronted the question whether an employee could 
receive compensation from the first insurer for an ear~ier hand injury 
after he had executed a lump sum settlement with a second insurer 
for a later knee injury, which later injury contributed! ten percent to 
his incapacity. The Court held that to allow such compensation 
"would constitute double recovery and violate the st~tutory scheme" 
and concluded that the lump sum settlement of the later knee i~ury 
eliminated all rights to incapacity compensation fori the unrelated 
prior hand injury, so long as the knee injury played aI1Y part, no mat-
ter how slight, in the employee's incapacity.2 The Court thus affirmed 
the decision of the Appeals Court,3 which had rever~ed a decree of 
the superior court enforcing the Industrial Accident Board's award of 
compensation for total and partial incapacity for the h~nd injury for a 
period beginning shortly after the lump sum settlement of the knee 
injury. In denying compensation from the first insurer., the Supreme 
Judicial Court applied the successive insurer rule4 for the first time to 
the case of an employee who had sustained two inju*es to different 
parts of the body and had not merely aggravated a pre-existing condi-
tion with a subsequent injury to the same place. The Cpurt's novel ex-
tension of the successive insurer rule introduces dangerous uncer-
tainty into the scope of the rule itself, as well as to thel effect of lump 
sum settlements, and thus brings confusion to the prjctical adminis-
*LAURENCE S. LOCKE is a partner in the law firm of Petkun and Ldcke, Boston and is 
the author of the Massachusetts Practice Series Volume on workmen's compensation. 
§3.1. I 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1849,351 N.E.2d 505. I 
2Id. at 1851-52,351 N.E.2d at 506-07. 
3 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1182, 1185-86,334 N.E.2d 633, 63t-35. 
4 The successive insurer rule requires that "[w]here there have been several compen-
sable injuries, received during successive periods of coverage of different insurers, the 
subsequent incapacity must be compensated by the one which was I the insurer at the 
time of the most recent injury that bore causal relation to the incapafity." Evans's Case, 
299 Mass. 435, 437, 13 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1938). 
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tration of the Workmen's Compensation Act.s 
On October 3, 1966 a painter injured his left hand, resulting in 
amputation of his index finger and five other surgical procedures.6 
The first insurer, Shelby Mutual (the "first insurer" or "Shelby"), paid 
benefits for total incapacity until the employee went to work for 
another employer insured by Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Company (the "second insurer" or "Hartford"). Two weeks after start-
ing work, on June 7, 1967, the employee fell from a ladder and seri-
ously injured his right knee. The second insurer thereafter paid com-
pensation benefits for approximately twenty-seven months until it and 
the employee reached a lump sum agreement on September 5, 1969, 
redeeming Hartford's liability for compensation for that injury under 
section 48 of chapter 152 of the General Laws7 for $8,656. Shortly 
thereafter, the employee filed a claim against Shelby for further in-
capacity compensation for the prior left hand injury. Shelby paid 
compensation voluntarily, without prejudice, from September 6, 1969 
to November 20, 1969. In May 1971, after a hearing, the single 
member of the Industrial Accident Board awarded benefits for total 
incapacity and dependency from November 20, 1969 to February 17, 
1970, and for partial incapacity thereafter. When this decision was af-
firmed by the reviewing board, Shelby appealed to the superior court. 
The superior court remanded for findings on the contribution of the 
knee injury to the incapacity. On remand, the Board found that the 
knee injury contributed ten percent to the incapacity, and renewed 
the award of total dependency, and partial compensation.s The 
superior court then entered a decree sustaining the award, which de-
cree was reversed in the Appeals Court. 9 
The Supreme Judicial Court subsequently affirmed the Appeals 
Court decision and held that the lump sum agreement with the sec-
ond insurer barred the employee from further recovery for incapacity 
caused, in part, by the second injury.1o Like the Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court reached this result through a three-step 
analysis. First, the Court noted that "it is settled that on a series of in-
juries contributing to an existing condition of disability the insurer 
5 G.L. c. 152. 
6 The facts of the case appear at 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1850,351 N.E.2d at 506. 
7 Section 48 provides in pertinent part: 
Whenever the division deems it to be for the best interests of the employee or his 
dependents, and the parties agree, the liability for compensation may be redeemed 
by the payment in whole or in part by the insurer of a lump sum of an amount to 
be fixed by the division, not exceeding the amount provided by this chapter. 
G.L. c. 152, § 48. 
8 In addition, the Board awarded payments of $500 for loss of function of the 
claimant's hand under G.L. c. 152, §§ 36(m) and 36(q) (as in effect on the date of his 
injury, prior to Acts of 1972, c. 741) and medical fees. These awards were not the sub-
ject of this appeal. 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1184, 334 N.E.2d at 634. 
• 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1184, 334 N.E.2d at 634-35. 
10 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852,351 N.E.2d at 507. 
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covering the risk at the time of the last injury is r1Ponsibie for all 
disability payments."ll Thus, because the knee inju contributed ten 
percent to the employee's claimed incapacity, the s ccessive insurer 
rule required the second insurer to assume total liability for compen-
sation due the employee.12 Second, the Court reasoHd that the lump 
sum agreement entered into by the employee with t e second insurer 
was, in effect, a substitution for continuing peri dic payments. 13 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the negotiation of the lump sum 
agreement should not change the result under the spccessive insurer 
rule because the lump sum agreement, which substit*ted for continu-
ing periodic payments, represented the second insurer's assumption 
of the total liability for compensation due the emPloree.14 Third, the 
Court noted that to allow additional recovery against the first insurer 
in this situation would constitute double recovery and violate the 
.statutory scheme}5 An analysis of each of these three steps in the 
Court's approach will serve both to highlight the extrnt to which the 
Court's opinion introduces dangerous uncertainty ijlto the practical 
administration of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and to suggest 
an approach whereby such uncertainty can be minimized. 
A. SUCCESSIVE INSURER RULE I 
In the first portion of its analysis, the Court applied the successive 
insurer rule to the facts of Carrier's Case. The successi~e insurer rule16 
operates to allocate responsibility for payment of cOIfpensation when 
an employee's disability results from the combined effect of two or 
more injuries. The rule requires that only one insurer be chargeable 
for the payment of compensation for a single period lof disability and 
allocates that responsibility to the insurer who was cofering the risk at 
the time of the most recent injury bearing a causal relation to the 
incapacityY This allocation of responsibility is a IOglcal extension of 
the basic principle that the employer and its insurer I take the worker 
"as is," with all his weaknesses and pre-existing infirmities, thereby be-
coming responsible for any aggravation of those infirmities occurring 
as a result of another personal injury suffered dUrin, the period cov-
11 [d. at 1851, 351 N.E.2d at 506. See 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1185, 334 
N.E.2d at 634-35. 1 
12 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852, 351 N.E.2d at 507. See 1975 Ma s. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
at 1185, 334 N.E.2d at 634-35. 
13 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852, 351 N.E.2d at 507. See 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
at 1185. 334 N.E.2d at 635. 
14 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852, 351 N.E.2d at 507. See 1975 Ma~s. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
at 1185-86, 334 N.E.2d at 635. .I 
15 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1853, 351 N.E.2d at 635. See 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
at 1186,334 N.E.2d at 635. 
18 For application of the successive insurer rule, see cases collected at L. LOCKE, 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 29 Mass. Prac. § 178, at 211-15 (1968) I[hereinafter cited as 
LOCKE]. 
17 Evans's Case, 299 Mass. 435, 437, 13 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1938). 
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ered by the insurance policy.i8 The rule, therefore, holds the second 
insurer responsible even if the last injury contributed only in a very 
minor way to the subsequent disability,l9 and even if the latest injury 
does not add to the physiological damage but only increases its 
symptoms.20 The first insurer, on the other hand, is responsible only 
in a few limited situations, primarily where there is, in fact, no second 
injury and the claimed disability results solely from the recurrence of 
the prior injury.21 
Before the decision in Carrier's Case, the successive insurer rule had 
been applied only in situations where the successive injuries involved 
the same part of the body and the incapacity resulted from further 
aggravation of the pre-existing condition. 22 Cases involving the succes-
sive insurer rule, therefore, have tended in the past to cluster around 
certain physical problems particularly susceptible to recurrence and 
aggravation: dermatitis, emphysema, hernia, and disorders of the 
lung, heart, and back.23 More importantly, two separate factors sug-
gest that until Carrier's Case, Massachusetts courts did not contemplate 
the extension of the successive insurer rule to situations where the 
employee had sustained injuries to different parts of the body. 
First, in seeking to allocate the responsibility for compensation of a 
"disability" resulting from two or more injuries,24 the courts were 
using the term to mean "physical impairment"25 and not to connote a 
more generalized "impairment of earning capacity."26 Accordingly, 
the successive insurer rule, as expressed in decisions preceding 
18See Donlan's Case, 317 Mass. 291, 294, 58 N.E.2d 4,5 (1955); Branconnier's Case, 
223 Mass. 273, 274, III N.E. 792, 793 (1916); Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 494-98, 
III N.E. 379, 382-84 (1916); Brightman's Case, 220 Mass. 17,20, 107 N.E. 527, 528 
(1914). 
19 Long's Case, 337 Mass. 517, 521, 150 N.E.2d 282, 284 (1958); McConolouge's 
Case, 336 Mass. 396, 399, 145 N.E.2d 831, 833 (1957). 
20 Long's Case, 337 Mass. 517, 521,150 N.E.2d 282, 284 (1958). 
21 Sulham's Case, 337 Mass. 586, 590, 150 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1958); Rasso's Case, 324 
Mass. 190, 192, 85 N.E.2d 332, 333 (1949); Sylvia's Case, 313 Mass. 313, 314, 47 
N.E.2d 293, 294 (1943); Davis's Case, 304 Mass. 530, 534, 24 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1939). 
22 See LOCKE, supra note 16, § 178, at 214 & n.93. Footnote 93 catalogues the cases ac-
cording to the various parts of the body involved in the respective claims. 
23 Id. 
24 Courts commonly characterize the rule as requiring that "[olnly one insurer can be 
charged for the same disability, [such thatl where there are several successive insurers, 
chargeability for the whole compensation rests upon the one covering the risk at the 
time of the most recent injury that bears a causal relation to the disability." Casey's 
Case, 348 Mass. 572, 574, 204 N.E.2d 710, 711 (1965) (emphasis added). See 
McConolouge's Case, 336 Mass. 396, 398, 145 N.E.2d 831, 833 (1957). 
USee e.g., Casey's Case, 348 Mass. 572, 574, 204 N.E.2d 710, 711 (1965); Tassone's 
Case, 330 Mass. 545, 546, 116 N.E.2d 126, 127 (1953) ("The employee ... suffered dis-
ability consisting of dermatitis on her hands and arms as a result of contact with ce-
ment."). 
26 "Impairment of earning capacity" is, however, the appropriate meaning of "in-
capacity" in G.L. c. 152, §§ 34, 34A and 35, where the Workmen's Compensation Act 
awards payments when the "incapacity for work resulting from the injury" is, respe( 
tively, either total, both total and permanent, or partial. 
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Carrier's Case, would apply only when the successive injuries had com-
bined to cause one disability, and not merely when independent injuries 
to different parts of the body had combined to cause one incapacity 
for work. Thus, the very language used in setting forth the rule sug-
gests that the courts did not envision its extension to situations where 
the employee had sustained injuries to different parts of the body. 
The second factor which indicates that courts, until Carrier's Case, 
intended to confine the application of the successive insurer rule to 
cases where successive injuries to the same part of the body had 
created one disability, is the range of benefits which the rule made the 
responsibility of the second insurer. Prior successive insurer cases re-
quired the subsequent insurer to pay all the compensation provided 
by law for the effects of the aggravating injury.27 Such compensation 
includes not just weekly incapacity compensation,28 but also medical 
and hospital treatment,29 specific compensation for losses of bodily 
function or disfigurement,30 and rehabilitation programs.3! The very 
range of benefits for which the second insurer was made responsible 
under the successive insurer rule presumes that the employee has sus-
tained successive injuries to one part of the body. If the employee had 
received different injuries to different parts of the body, there would 
be no logic in making the second insurer liable not only for weekly in-
capacity compensation, but also for medical treatment of an earlier 
impairment totally unrelated to the injury received during the second 
insurer's coverage of the risk. 
Not only the courts' treatment of the successive insurer rule, but 
also the Workmen's Compensation Act itself would have suggested, 
prior to the decision in Carrier's Case, that the rule would have no ap-
plication where the successive injuries were to different parts of the 
body. Section 15A of chapter 152 of the General Laws, the only pro-
vision of the Workmen's Compensation Act specifically addressing the 
problems posed by a controversy between successive insurers, pre-
sumes that the liability at issue arises as the result of successive in-
juries to the same part of the body. To avoid leaving the injured em-
ployee without compensation pending the resolution of the con-
troversy, section 15A provides that "[iJf one or more claims are filed 
27 See, e.g., McConolouge's Case, 336 Mass. 396, 398, 145 N.E.2d 831, 833 (1957) 
(The "whole burden of compensation for subsequent incapacity" rests on the second in-
surer.); Donahue's Case, 290 Mass. 239, 241, 195 N.E. 345, 346 (1935) ("none of our 
decisions give any support to the suggestion that several insurers can be held jointly."). 
28 The Workmen's Compensation Act provides for compensation for total incapacity 
under § 34, and for partial incapacity under § 35. G.L. c. 152, §§ 34, 35. 
29 The injured employee is entitled to "adequate and reasonable medical and hospital 
services" under G.L. c. 152. § 30. 
30 Extra payment of "specific compensation" for certain specified injuries is au-
thorized under G.L. c. 152, § 36.Furthermore, the right to specific compensation sur-
vives the death of the employee. [d. § 36A. 
31 [d. §§ 30, 30A-30D. 
5
Locke: Chapter 3: Workmen's Compensation Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
§3.1 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 55 
for an injury and two or more insurers ... may be held to be liable to 
pay compensation therefor" either of the insurers can be temporarily 
charged with the duty to pay the compensation, and then be subse-
quently reimbursed if a final decision should place liability on a dif-
ferent insurer.32 Thus, by referring to injury, rather than incapacity, 
the section suggests that only successive injuries to the same part of 
the body can trigger the application of the successive insurer rule. 
In Carner's Case, however, both the Supreme Judicial Court and the 
Appeals Court applied the successive insurer rule to an employee who 
had sustained unrelated injuries to different parts of the body. Al-
though each court noted that the first injury was to the hand and the 
second to the knee,33 both opinions glossed over the distinction. The 
Supreme Judicial Court made no further reference to the separate 
character of the injuries and applied the successive insurer rule with-
out comment.34 Similarly, the Appeals Court paused only to make the 
summary, unsupported observation that "[ilt does not mat!er that the 
second injury contributing to the incapacity is unrelated to the first in-
jury, so long as both injuries have contributed to the same 
incapacity. "35 
The unprecedented application by the Massachusetts courts of the 
successive insurer rule to cases involving two injuries to different parts 
of the body is extremely problematic. One central difficulty arises as a 
result of the uncertain scope of the liability assumed by the second in-
surer under the rule of Carrier's Case. Although the Court's sweeping 
language imposes on the second insurer "the total liability for com-
pensation due the employee,"36 the opinion fails to clarify exactly 
what is meant by "compensation due the employee." On one hand, a 
literal application of the holding in Carrier's Case might create arbi-
trary and clearly unintended results by requiring the second insurer to 
be responsible for both weekly incapacity compensation and specific 
benefits triggered as a result of the first i~ury. Because "compensa-
tion due the employee" encompasses the cost of medical and hospital 
treatment,37 Carner's Case suggests that the insurer of the later knee 
i~ury has "assumed the total liability" for bills for treatment of the 
previously suffered hand injury, so long as the knee i~ury contributes 
to the employee's incapacity. Thus, if the employee were to die in the 
course of an operation on his hand, Hartford, the second insurer, 
32 [d. § 15A (emphasis added). 
331976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1850, 351 N.E.2d at 506; 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 
1182-83,334 N.E.2d at 634. 
34 The Court merely noted that U[iJn the circumstances of this case the second insurer 
assumed the total liability for compensation due the employee .... " 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1852,351 N.E.2d at 507. 
35 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1185, 334 N.E.2d at 635. See notes 28-31 supra. 
38 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852,351 N.E.2d at 507. 
37 See Boardman's Case, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 625, 631-32, 310 N.E.2d 593, 598. 
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would be compelled to pay death benefits to the dependents, despite 
the complete absence of a causal relationship between the death and 
the knee injury sustained during the period Hartford covered the 
risk. It is unlikely, however, that the Court would countenance such 
an arbitrary result. 
On the other hand, a reluctance to accord a literal interpretation to 
the Carrier's Case language creates conceptual problems insofar as such 
an interpretation would necessitate an apportionment of liability 
among insurers. Such an apportionment of liability gives rise to pre-
cisely the situation that the successive insurer rule was designe9 to 
avoid38 and injects confusion into the practical administration of an 
Act intended to be simple and summary.39 In Carrier's Case, for exam-
ple, the first insurer, Shelby, did not appeal from that part of the 
Board's award for payments for loss of function of the employee's 
hand and medical fees. 40 Thus, despite the Court's sweeping refer-
ence to the second insurer's "total liability for compensation due the 
employee," the final result in Carrier's Case was an apportionment of 
responsibility between the two insurers such that Shelby, the first in-
surer, was liable for specific benefits causally related to the first hand 
injury and Hartford, the second insurer, assumed the responsibility 
for weekly incapacity compensation as well as specific benefits causally 
related to the second knee injury. 
The foregoing analysis, therefore, illustrates how the imprecise lan-
guage in Carrier's Case which speaks of the "total liability for compen-
sation due the employee" suggests two possible formulations of the 
scope of liability thereby imposed on the second insurer, neither one 
of which is particularly satisfactory. However, the dangerous potential 
for arbitrary results created under the first, more literal approach, to-
gether with the actual result reached on the facts of Carrier's Case, in-
dicates that the Supreme Judicial Court probably will construe "total 
liability for compensation due the employee" to require an appor-
tionment of liability between the two insurers. According to this con-
struction, the second insurer is liable for the weekly incapacity com-
pensation, but each insurer remains responsible for the medical fees, 
death benefits, or rehabilitation expenses causally related to the par-
ticular injury sustained during the period in which it insured the 
employee. 41 
A second difficulty inherent in the Carrier's Case extension of the 
successive insurer rule to cases involving two injuries to different parts 
38 Evans's Case, 299 Mass. 435, 437, 13 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1938). 
39 G.L. c. 152, § 56 ("Process and procedure shall be as simple and summary as 
reasonably may be."). 
40 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1184,334 N.E.2d at 634 . 
.. The last insurer, however, would be liable for the payment of medical bills or 
death benefits connected with an earlier unrelated injury if the later irUury contributes 
both to the incapacity and either to the necessity of the particular medical treatment in 
question or to the death. 
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of the body stems from the incentive it gives to the employee to claim 
compensation for a later injury in order to become entitled to higher 
weekly benefits when suffering from recurrence of an earlier but 
unrelated injury by alleging that both injuries contributed to the in-
capacity thus triggering application of the successive insurer rule. For 
example, a worker might be injured in 1966 when the maximum 
weekly benefit for total incapacity was $58.42 After a period of in-
capacity, the condition might improve and the worker return to work. 
Then, in 1975 when the weekly maximum was $95,43 he might sustain 
a second injury for which specific compensation is due under section 
36 of chapter 152 of the General Laws, such as loss of a finger or loss 
of vision in one eye. Subsequently, this second injury could improve 
and the employee again return to work whereupon he suffers a re-
currence of the original injury requiring hospitalization and pro-
longed medical care. Before the opinion in Carrier's Case, the em-
ployee would have claimed further compensation from the first in-
surer, receiving a maximum weekly benefit of $58. The Court's deci-
sion in Carrier's Case, however, will entitle the employee to receive 
compensation at the higher weekly rate of $95 a week from the sec-
ond insurer for the incapacity caused by a recurrence of the earlier 
unrelated injury so long as he can prove that the second injury con-
tributed to that incapacity, even to a minor degree. 44 The second in-
surer, to avoid liability, would have to contend that the effects of the 
first injury had never cleared up, and that the later incident did not 
aggravate the condition.45 The creation by Carrier's Case of such incen-
tives to claim that an incapacity caused by the recurrence of an earlier 
injury is aggravated by a subsequent unrelated injury will create 
further confusion and uncertainty in the administration of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. It is likely to generate an influx of 
cases in which the Board will be forced to make nice distinctions in 
applying the successive insurer rule to situations where the second in-
jury is to a separate part of the body, and apart from Carrier, unre-
lated to the claimed incapacity. 
Strict adherence to the successive insurer rule, as previously inter-
preted by the Supreme Judicial Court and followed by the Industrial 
Accident Board since the 1938 decision in Evans's Case,46 would have 
avoided the potential for confusion and injustice created by the 
Court's extension of the rule in Carrier's Case. Until Carrier's Case, 
claims for two different injuries to different parts of the body were 
always treated separately. Each insurer was liable for the benefits re-
lating to the injury sustained during his period of coverage. Thus, the 
42 Acts of 1965, c. 644, § I. 
43 G.L. C. 152, § 34, amended by Acts of 1973, c. 978, § 4 . 
.. See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1851, 351 N.E.2d at 506-07. 
45 See text at note 21 supra. 
46 299 Mass. 435, 13 N.E.2d 27 (1938). 
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employee received the full range of benefits to which he was entitled, 
while at the same time was precluded, under Mizrahi's Case, from dou-
ble recovery for the same period of incapacity,47 
B. LUMP SUM SETTLEMENTS 
The second step of the Court's analysis in Carrier's Case concerns the 
scope and effect of a lump sum settlement. The Court's approach to 
this issue promises to create further unnecessary confusion. In most 
cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation 
is paid by voluntary agreement between the insurer and the 
employee.48 Such agreements are enforceable only if approved by the 
Division of Industrial Accidents of the Department of Labor and In-
dustries, and approval is forthcoming only when an agreement's terms 
conform to the Act. 49 Compromise is permitted only in the case of 
lump sum settlements authorized under section 48 of chapter 152 of 
the General Laws.50 
Although they may be treated as payments under the Act,51 settle-
ment agreements approved under section 48 do not represent simply 
the equivalent of a lump sum advance of continuing periodic compen-
sation payments to which the employee would otherwise be entitled 
over a period of time. The many factors that influence the parties in 
arriving at the lump sum agreement indicate the difficulties in con-
struing lump sum payments as merely representing continuing 
periodic compensation. Cases in which an insurer's liability for com-
pensation iLredeemed by a lump sum settlement fall into two basic 
47 Mizrahi's Case, 320 Mass. 733, 736-37, 71 N.E.2d 383,385 (1947). 
48 See LOCKE, supra note 16, § 551, at 669. 
49 C.L. c. 152, § 6. Thus, an employee may not agree to receive less than what he is 
entitled to under the Workmen's Compensation Act. LOCKE, supra note 16, § 551, at 
669. 
50 Section 48 provides that: 
Whenever the division deems it to be for the best interests of the employee or his 
dependents, and the parties agree, the liability for compensation may be redeemed 
by the payment in whole or in part by the insurer of a lump sum of an amount to 
be fixed by the division, not exceeding the amount provided by this chapter. The 
division, in the case of a minor who has received permanently disabling injuries, 
either partial or total, may, at any time before or after he attains his majority, pre 
vide that he be compensated, in whole or in part by the payment of a lump sum, 
of an amount to be fixed by the division, not exceeding the amount provided by 
this chapter. 
"' Because claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act can be settled only under 
C.L. c. 152, § 48, lump sum settlement payments have been regarded as "compensa-
tion" in other circumstances. See LOCKE, supra note 16, § 551, at 672. For example, a 
lump sum payment may be allocated to extend the period of time in which a public 
employee. could apply for a pension. Cannon v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 
338 Mass. 628, 633-35, 156 N.E.2d 654, 658-59 (1959). Similarly, a lump sum agree-
ment is treated as "the compensation provided" for incapacity and medical care, enti-
tling the insurer to reimbursement from the second injury fund for payments made 
under the lump sum settlement. Henderson's Case, 349 Mass. 683, 685, 212 N.E.2d 
455,457 (1965). 
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categories.52 In the first group, the lump sum represents a com-
promise between the parties who dispute the insurer's liability to pay 
compensation.53 In arriving at the lump sum figure, the parties will 
consider issues of liability, casual relation, extent of disability, as well 
as the possibilities of later recurrence, further medical expense, or 
even death from the injury. In the second category, there IS no real 
dispute as to the insurer's liability and the lump sum represents a 
commutation of the payment of benefits into a single sum. The final 
settlement, however, reflects not simply this agreement as to the 
insurer's liability, but also the parties' assessment of the possibility that 
the insurer may escape its full obligation as the result of a superven-
ing injury or death.54 In both categories further uncertainty is intro-
duced by the intangibles that figure into any negotiated settlement: 
the relative abilities of counsel, the attitude of the tribunal, and the 
eagerness or reluctance of the claimant to settle. 
In holding that a settlement is binding even in the event of a later 
change of condition,55 courts have recognized that lump sum settle-
ments reflect these varied factors and are not merely the equivalents 
of continuing periodic compensation payments. In McCarthy's Case, for 
example, an employee went blind after settling his claim under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act.56 Although this possibility was not 
even contemplated by the employee's doctors at the time he settled his 
case, the Court determined that the settlement was binding.57 In ef-
fect, the Court thus indicated that it did not conceive of the lump sum 
settlement as merely a substitute for all compensation that the em-
ployee would be entitled to receive insofar as the Court upheld a lump 
sum agreement that failed to account for a disability which otherwise 
52 Section 48 makes no distinction between these two functions of commutation and 
compromise except with respect to a minor who has received permanent disabling in-
juries in which case the statute contemplates an established liability and provides only 
for commutation. G.L. c. 152, §48. LOCKE, supra note 16, § 552, at 672-73. The minor's 
lump sum settlement can be set by the Industrial Accident Board and does not depend 
upon agreement of the parties. [d. at 672. In practice, however, most cases involve ele-
ments of both commutation and compromise. 
53 The dispute may be a disagreement as to original liability, the extent of present 
disability, or the insurer's responsibility for further compensation for a recurrence of 
the original condition. See, LOCKE, supra note 16, § 551, at 669-70. 
54 Nor is the life expectancy of the employee the sole factor because the lump sum 
settlement does not bar any rights which may accrue to the employee's spouse or de-
pendents if they survive him, Macfarlane's Case, 330 Mass. 573, 576-77, 115 N.E.2d 925, 
926-27 (1953); Cripps' Case, 216 Mass. 586, 589, 104 N.E. 565, 566 (1914). Thus, as the 
parties assess the insurer's potential liability to the claimant's dependents, it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to assume that the lump sum settlement approximates compensation 
for any specified period of time. 
55 See LOCKE, supra note 16, § 551, at 671. 
58 226 Mass. 444,446,115 N.E. 764, 764 (1917). 
57 [d. 
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would have increased the employee's benefits.58 
In Camer's Case, however, both the Appeals Court and the Supreme 
Judicial Court characterized the lump sum settlement that the em-
ployee negotiated with the second insurer as the equivalent of "all 
compensation payments which the employee would be entitled to re-
ceive in the future as a result of his incapacity."59 This characteriza-
tion was critical to both decisions. From it, the Supreme Judicial Court 
reasoned: 
Both the compensation the employee has elected to receive in a 
lump sum from the second insurer and the payments now sought 
from the first insurer are based on incapacity and cover the same 
period of time. To allow an additional recovery against the first 
insurer in this situation would be to give the employee a double 
recovery for his incapacity.60 
The Court's mischaracterization of the nature of the lump sum set-
tlement is disturbing because it adds to the confusion created by the 
extension of the successive insurer rule to cases where an employee 
has received injuries to different parts of the body. The SupremeJu-
dicial Court alluded to the employee's "misapprehension that he was 
merely effecting a settlement of a claim with respect to his knee in-
jury" and suggested the desirable practice of notifying the employee 
when a lump sum agreement is negotiated "that its effect will be as is 
demonstrated in this case."61 Delineation of this projected "effect" is 
problematic because, as noted above,62 the scope of the extension of 
the successive insurer rule to the Camer situation is not clear. Thus, it 
is not certain whether the employee's negotiation of a lump sum set-
tlement compromises only his rights to incapacity compensation from 
the first insurer, or whether it also precludes recovery for medical 
fees, rehabilitation costs, and death benefits causally related to the 
first injury.63 In light of the illogic in holding the second insurer liable 
for both incapacity compensation and specific benefits for an unre-
lated first injury,64 it would seem that the receipt of a lump sum set-
tlement should not foreclose the employee'S right to specific benefits 
58 Blindness would have entitled the employee to specific compensation benefits. C.L. 
c. 152. § 36. 
59 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852,351 N.E.2d at 507 (footnote omitted). See 1975 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1186, 334 N.E.2d at 635 ("The lump sum agreement should be 
regarded as a substitute for continuing periodic compensation payments."). For author-
ity, both courts relied on Paltsios's Case, 329 Mass. 526, 109 N.E.2d 163 (1952), which 
involved the commutation of a minor's lump sum and therefore involved entirely dif-
ferent considerations. See note 52 supra. 
80 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852-53, 351 N.E.2d at 507. 
U [d. at 1852 n.2, 351 N.E.2d at 507 n.2. 
82 See text supra at notes 31-36. 
83 In Carrier's Case, the first insurer did not appeal from the Board's award of specific 
benefits. 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1184, 334 N.E.2d at 635. 
8. See text supra at notes 35-41. 
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from the first insurer. However, uncertainty as to the effect of the 
lump sum payment does not only center around the distinction be-
tween incapacity compensation and specific benefits. The Court's mis-
characterization of the lump sum settlement also raises the possibility that 
the employee might not be able to claim compensation for a future 
injury.65 
Thus, Carrier's Case hinders the parties' ability to gauge the effect of 
lump sum settlements on potential claims for injuries other than the 
personal injury being settled. As a result, lawyers representing claim-
ants (and the Board in approving settlements) are in a most difficult 
and delicate situation. Obviously, full disclosure of the possible impli-
cations of the settlement for other injuries must be made to the claim-
ant at the time of the settlement. But employees may be understand-
ably reluctant to enter into lump sum settlements which have such un-
certain effect. Lump sum settlements play a prominent part in the 
processing of workmen's compensation claims, and a break down in 
the lump sum mechanism will leave insurers with an open-ended risk 
on cases that otherwise would appropriately be closed and will require 
the trial of hundreds of controverted cases, which otherwise would be 
appropriately settled, with the attendant increase in backlog of unre-
solved claims at the Board. 
None of this confusion was necessary because the existing practice 
with regard to lump sums would have adequately dealt with the situa-
tion if the Court had not extended the successive insurer rule to dis-
similar personal injuries. Before Carrier's Case, when a settlement was 
made for a second injury to the same part of the body, the redemp-
tion of the second insurer's liability foreclosed any claim for overlap-
ping disability or medical care from any prior injuries to that part of 
the body.66 But injuries to other parts of the body were unaffected, 
and a valid claim could be made for any compensation resulting from 
such injury, disregarding the effect of any later injury, whether set-
tled by lump sum or still open. That was all that was necessary before 
Carrier extended the successive insurer rule to dissimilar personal in-
juries and thereby introduced the present confusion. 
C. DANGER OF DOUBLE RECOVERY 
In the third step in its analysis, the Court in Carrier's Case reasoned 
that to allow the employee to receive incapacity and dependency com-
pensation for his hand injury after he had lump summed his later 
65 In the absence of a lump sum settlement, a future injury might entitle the em-
ployee to additional benefits if, for example, it triggered the right to specific compensa-
tion under C.L. c. 152, § 36, or if it increased the extent of a partial incapacity. Com-
pensation for partial incapacity is computed according to "the entire difference between 
[the employee's] average weekly wage before the injury and the average weekly wage he 
is able to earn thereafter .... " C.L. c. 152, § 35. 
"See cases collected at LOCKE. supra note 16, § 178, at 211-15. 
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knee injury would constitute double recovery and violate the statutory 
scheme.67 As indicated by the foregoing analysis, the Court's fear of 
double recovery was unjustified since the payment by way of lump 
sum could not appropriately be allocated to any specific period of 
time which could be said to overlap the period for which compensa-
tion was awarded so as to constitute double recovery for such a 
period. 
All previous cases in which the potential for double recovery was an 
issue involved either an identified period of incapacity or an iden-
tified benefit, such as medical care or specific compensation,68 with 
respect to which the Court justifiably sought to insure that the em-
ployee not receive duplicate or overlapping payments.69 The "double 
recovery" issue was most sharply presented in Mizrahi's Case. 70 In that 
case the employee first sustained a hernia which did not immediately 
cause incapacity and then a second injury to his fingers which did 
cause temporary total incapacity for which he received compensation 
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act. 71 While so incapacitated, he underwent an operation to repair 
the hernia, an operation which itself would have caused total incapac-
ity for ten weeks. Although the insurer on the hernia case had agreed 
to pay his medical and hospital bills, the employee was not satisfied 
and sought total incapacity compensation for that ten week period 
under the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act. The em-
ployee argued that payment by another insurer for a later injury to a 
separate part of the body under a different compensation act should 
"not be considered" in "determining the compensation payable" under 
the Act since such payment was a "benefit derived from" a "source 
other than the insurer" within the meaning of section 38 of chapter 
152 of the General Laws.72 Otherwise, the employee maintained, the 
87 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1853, 351 N.E.2d at 506. See 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
at 1186, 334 N.E.2d at 635. 
88 See, e.g., Casey's Case, 348 Mass. 572, 574, 204 N.E.2d 710, 711 (1965); Evans's 
Case, 299 Mass. 435, 437, 13 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1938). 
Specific benefits are awarded under G.L. c. 152, § 36, which provides for weekly 
payments for certain specified injuries "in addition to all other compensation." Section 
36 provides that "[nlothing in this section shall adversely affect the employee's right to 
any compensation which is or may become due under the provisions of this or any 
other section." Thus, it would not constitute double recovery for an employee to receive 
both incapacity compensation and specific benefits for the same period. 
89 The statute provides for double recovery only "[ilf the employee is injured by 
reason of the serious and willful misconduct of an employer .... " G.L. c. 152, § 28. 
70 320 Mass. 733, 71 N.E.2d 383 (1947). 
71 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970). 
72 G.L. C. 152, § 38 provides that "[nlo savings or insurance of the injured employee 
independent of this chapter shall be considered in determining the compensation pay-
able thereunder, nor shall benefits derived from any other source than the insurer be 
considered in such determination." The Court, however, concluded that this section was 
not "intended to save to the employee the fortuitous advantage of receiving double com-
pensation for the same injury or incapacity." 320 Mass. at 73-7, 71 N.E.2d at 385. 
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result would constitute a windfall to the insurer.73 The Court, how-
ever, brushed aside these arguments as mere "technicalities" and con-
cluded that the employee was not entitled to further recovery "[s]ince 
both the compensation which [he] had received under the Federal Act 
and that [sought] under the State Act are posited upon total incapac-
ity and not upon specific injury and cover the same period of time . ... "74 
Thus, the decision in Mizrahi's Case would seem "to bar two simul-
taneous awards of total compensation, even though based on two 
separate injuries."75 
In Carrier's Case, however, the lump sum settlement could not con-
stitute a basis for finding that allowing recovery against the first in-
surer would give rise to "two simultaneous awards of total compensa-
tion" since the agreement could not properly be considered the equiv-
alent of periodic incapacity compensation over a specified period of 
time. 76 Only by mischaracterizing lump sum payments as the equiva-
lent of the receipt of weekly payments over a specified period could 
the Court conceive that the prospect of the employee's recovery from 
the first insurer presented the danger of double recovery. Further-
more, the Court's reference to the danger of double recovery was 
gratuitous and unnecessary to the decision. Once it had extended the 
successive insurer rule to the situation where the employee had sus-
tained different injuries to different parts of the body, there was no 
need to advert to the danger of double recovery since the lump sum 
settlement of the second injury itself barred any recovery of addi-
tional incapacity compensation so long as the second injury played 
some '!light part in the claimant's' incapacity. 77 
The Court's mischaracterization of the nature of lump sum settle-
ments together with its gratuitous reference to the danger of double 
recovery combine to create a potential for an unwarranted extension 
of the rationale of Carrier's Case. Some insurers have suggested that 
the case would bar claims for incapacity compensation, or even possi-
bly specific benefits, for a subsequent injury to another part of the 
body for a defined period78 after the execution of a lump sum settle-
ment. Otherwise, according to this argument, receipt of such benefits 
during that defined period would constitute double recovery. 
In effect, the Court in relying on "double recovery" in' Camer's Case 
has evinced its willingness to enlarge a concept the impact of which 
73 See 320 Mass. at 735-37, 71 N.E.2d at 384-85. 
HId. at 735, 71 N.E.2d at 384 (emphasis added). 
75 LOCKE, supra note 16, § 341, at 398. 
78 See notes 51-60 and accompanying text supra. 
77 See Carrier's Case, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1I85-86, 351 N.E.2d at 506-07. 
78 The proponents of this argument would compute this period by taking the net 
proceeds of the lump sum, deducting attorney's fees, medical expenses, specific benefits 
and amounts attributable to the release of the inchoate rights of a dependent, and divid-
ing this figure by the weekly compensation benefit to which the claimant otherwise 
would have been entitled. 
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should be narrowly confined. The concept of double recovery stands 
in direct opposition to the collateral source rule79 usually applied in 
personal injury claims. Furthermore, it impacts with undue harshness 
on employees who must forego their common law rights against their 
employers.8o Finally, it overlooks the reality "that the Workmen's 
Compensation Act ordinarily affords the employee rather slim 
recovery .... "81 While it is no doubt too late to argue that the concept 
of double recovery as applied to workmen's compensation should be 
discarded, it can be said with emphasis that it certainly should not be 
enlarsed. In particular, the concept certainly should not be applied to 
situatIons not involving an identified period or benefit, such as that 
presented by a lump sum settlement which redeems the insurer's lia-
bility for compensation for that one injury only, for an amount which 
must protect the employee from the consequences of that injury, 
known or unknown, for the rest of his life. 
It is important to state, in conclusion, exactly what the Camer doc-
trine means. Carrier's Case holds, first, that where an employee sus-
tained two or more injuries, whether to the same part of the body or 
to separate parts of the body, the insurer on the risk at the time of 
the latest injury which contributes to the incapacity is liable for the 
payment of compensation for the resulting incapacity.82 It does not 
hold that where the injuries are to different parts of the body, the last 
insurer is liable for the payment of medical bills for treatment of an 
unrelated earlier injury, even though the later injury contributes to 
the incapacity, unless the later injury also contributes to the necessity 
of the medical treatment in question.83 Similarly, it does not hold that 
the later insurer is liable for the payment of specific compensation for 
any loss of bodily function or disfigurement resulting from an unre-
lated earlier injury, even though the later injury contributes to the 
period of the incapacity, unless it also contributes to the specific 10ss.84 
It does not hold that where the injuries are to different parts of the 
body, the last insurer is liable for the payment of death benefits under 
sections 31, 32, and 33 of chapter 152 of the General Laws for death 
resulting from the earlier iJ1iury, even though the later iJ1iury contrib-
uted to a period of incapacity, unless the later injury also is causally 
related to the death. Although these latter consequences may seem to 
follow from the logic of the case, it is highly unlikely that our Court 
78 The collateral source rule "requires a tortfeasor to pay in full the damages suffered 
by the injured person, without credit for amounts received by the injured person from 
other sources such as an employer or an insurer .... " Pemrock, Inc. v. Essco Co., 252 
Md. 374, 378, 249 A.2d 711, 713 (1969). 
80 Meley's Case, 219 Mass. 136, 139, 106 N.E. 559, 560 (1914); Young v. Duncan, 218 
Mass. 346, 349, 106 N.E. I, 3(1914). 
81 Boardman's Case, 365 Mass. 185, 193, 310 N.E.2d 593, 598 (1974). 
81 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852,351 N.E.2d at 507. 
83 See text at notes 37 and 41 supra. 
"[d. 
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will permit them to be drawn. 
Second, Carrier holds that the liability of the first insurer in the 
above situations is no different whether the liability of the last insurer 
has been redeemed by a lump sum settlement or whether' it remains 
open.85 Accordingly, whatever liability the first insurer would have 
had, it will still have even if the liability of the last insurer has been 
redeemed by a lump sum settlement under section 48. 
Third, Carrier holds that redemption by lump sum settlement of the 
liability of the insurer of a later injury wipes out the liability of the in-
surers of prior injuries, even to dissimilar parts of the body, for a sub-
sequent period of incapacity where the later injury contributes even to 
a minor degree to such subsequent incapacity.86 But the lump sum 
does not wipe out the liability of insurers of prior injuries for specific 
compensation, medical care or rehabilitation, or death benefits when 
the right to such compensation results solely from the prior injuries, 
without regard to the injury which has been settled.87 Further, Carrier 
does not speak to, nor can it have any bearing on rights and liabilities 
for any subsequent personal injury arising out of and in the course of 
employment, occurring after the liability of the latest insurer has been 
redeemed by lump sum settlement. 
The dramatic extension of the successive insurer rule and the un-
expected effect on prior injuries given to lump sum settlement of a 
later unrelated injury have the potential for great harm and confu-
sion. Such harm and confusion will be greater if implications, never 
intended by the Court, are drawn from its sparse language. It is es-
sential that Carrier's Case be given the narrowest possible construction, 
so that damage be kept to a minimum. In addition, it is to be hoped 
that the Court will be given an early opportunity to consider the 
ramifications of Carrier and perhaps to clarify and confine its mean-
ing, particularly with regard to the successive insurer rule. It is also to 
be hoped that the Massachusetts General Court will look at the ruling 
on lump sums and decide that it does not represent the intent of the 
Legislature. In that event, a simple amendment would be in order, 
declaring that an employee's right to compensation under chapter 152 
of the General Laws shall not be affected by the lump sum settlement 
of any other injury. 
§3.2. Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment: 
Emergency Public Service: "Zone of Special Danger 
Concept." During the Survey year, in D'Angeli's Case, the Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld an employee'S right to recover workmen's com-
pensation when injured in the course of his endeavor to alleviate an 
8. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1851-52, 351 N.E.2d at 506-07. See text at notes 59-65 
supra. 
881976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1852-53,351 N.E.2d at 507. 
87 See text supra at note 64. 
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imminent danger to the public.l The Court thus continued its unwav-
ering adherence to a broad construction of the statutory requirement 
that the claimant have "receive[d] a personal injury arising out of and 
in the course of his employment."2 D'Angeli's Case is a landmark deci-
sion in the developing law which uses workmen's compensation as a 
vehicle for compensating the good samaritan. 3 
The employee in D'Angeli's Case was a diesel mechanic who, in addi-
tion to his work at corporate headquarters in Allston, repaired en-
gines outside the employer's premises. On November 8, 1966, he was 
returning to headquarters from a repair job in North Wilmington.4 
Traveling south on Route 93,5 the most direct. route to headquarters, 
he noticed an obstruction on the roadway-a tightly wound coil of 
heavy rope about three feet in diameter and six inches high. Believing 
it to be dangerous, he pulled into the breakdown lane and then pro-
ceeded on foot to the travel lane and removed the obstruction. While 
returning to his car, he was struck by an oncoming car and sustained 
severe injuries. The employee was totally disabled by the accident.8 
The single member of the Industrial Accident Board dismissed 
D'Angeli's claim, finding that he had not sustained a personal injury 
arising out of the course of his employment, and that his attempt to 
retrieve the rope constituted "a serious and substantial deviation from 
his employment."7 Thus, the single member determined that the em-
ployee, injured by reason of his "serious and willful misconduct within 
the meaning of Section 27 of [the Workmen's Compensation Act]," 
was not entitled to compensation.8 However, the reviewing board re-
versed the single member's decision on the ground that the "injury 
arose out of and in the course of ... employment."9 Furthen. ... ore, the 
Board noted that "although the employee used poor judgment In ret-
rospect in going onto Route 93 . . . it did not amount to serious and 
willful misconduct."lo Thus, the reviewing board ordered that the 
§3.2. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 584,590,343 N.E.2d 368, 371. 
I G.L. c. 152, § 26. See, e.g., Collins' Dependent'S Case, 342 Mass. 389, 392-93, 173 
N.E.2d 641, 642-43 (1961); Castagna's Case, 310 Mass. 325, 329, 38 N.E.2d 63, 66 
(1941). 
3 See L. LocKE. WORKMEN"S CoMPENSATION, 29 Mass. Prac. §241, at 292-93 (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as LocIUJ; Comment, Wonbnen's Compensatiun: A Vehicle for compensat-
ing the Good Samaritan, 24 BUFFALO L REv. 857 (1975). 
41976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 585, 343 N.E.2d at 369. As authorized by the employer who 
reimbursed his mileage e~penses, the employee was driving his own motor vehicle. Id. 
5 Route 93 is a six-lane limited access highway with a breakdown lane on the right of 
each side of the road and various signs prohibiting pedestrians. At the time of the acci-
dent, there was a sixty mile per hour speed Iimit.ld. 
SId. at 586, 343 N.E.2d at 370. 
71d. 
8 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 586-87, 343 N.E.2d at 370. See G.L. c. 152, § 27, which pro-
vides, in part, that "[i]f the employee is injured by reason of his serious and willful mis-
conduct, he shall not receive compensation .... " 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 587,343 N.E.2d at 370, 
10/d. 
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employee be paid total incapacity compensation.H 
Noting that the Board's decision should stand unless it is unsup-
ported by the evidence or tainted by an error of law,12 the Supreme 
Judicial Court declined to follow Burgess's Case 13 and rejected the 
insurer's argument that the statutory term "course of employment" 
should be narrowly construed as not embracing the facts of D'Angeli's 
Case.14 Instead, the Court emphasized that it would not require that 
the employee be engaged in the actual performance of his duties at 
the moment of injury in order to recover compensation, but only that 
his activity be incidental to and not inconsistent with his 
employment,15 Accordingly, relying primarily on O'Leary v. Brown-
Pacific-Maxon, Inc.,16 the Court announced its "present view that when 
a conscientious citizen is in the course of his employment and per-
11 This award subsequently was affirmed by the superior court and then reversed by 
the Appeals Court. 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 888, 330 N.E.2d 499. 
12 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 588, 343 N.E.2d at 370. See Demetre's Case, 322 Mass. 95, 
98,76 N.E.2d 140, 142 (1947); LOCKE, supra note 3, § 583, at 690-93. 
14 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 589, 343 N.E.2d at 371. The insurer had relied on 
Burgess's Case as precedent for denying compensation to an employee allegedly far 
more deserving of recovery. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 588, 343 N.E.2d at 370. In that 
case the employee was a salesman who was injured when he pursued a robber who had 
shot an employee of the bank that the salesman was visiting when the crime took place. 
331 Mass. at 90, 117 N.E.2d at 148. The Court denied compensation on the ground 
that the employee had departed from the duties of his employment. [d. at 92, 117 
N.E.2d at 149. In D'Angeli's Case, the Court, citing LOCKE, supra note 3, § 241, at 
293-94 n.67, and 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 28.32, at 
5-292-5-293 (1972), noted that Burgess's Case had come under rigorous criticism and 
announced that "[iln so far as that case might be said to govern the application of the 
law to the facts in this case, we do not choose to follow it." 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 589, 
343 N.E.2d at 371. For further discussion of Burgess's Case, see Locke, Workmen's Com-
pensation Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 4.3, at 75-76 and 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. 
LAW § 5.3, at 138-39. 
15 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 589, 343 N.E.2d at 371, citing Canavan's Case, 364 Mass. 
762, 308 N.E.2d 534 (1974) (Board properly could award compensation to licensed 
practical nurse who sustained an injury, while off duty, in the course of seeking assis-
tance for injured boaters on her employer's premises); Peter's Case, 362 Mass. 888, 291 
N.E.2d 158 (1972) (upholding award of compensation to an employee who ran in 
search of police when a fellow employee was assaulted). For a discussion of Peter's Case, 
see Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 5.3, at 137-40. 
16 340 U.S. 504 (1951). In O'Leary, the United States Supreme Court ordered rein-
statement of an award of compensation to an employee of a government contractor in 
Guam who had drowned while attempting to rescue two men from a dangerous chan-
nel which ran alongside a recreation center the employer maintained for its employees. 
[d. at 505, 509. The Court noted that recovery was not conditioned on the existence of 
a "causal relation between the nature of employment of the injured person and the ac-
cident," nor was it "necessary that the employee be engaged at the time of the injury in 
activity of benefit to his employer." [d. at 507. Instead, "[alII that is required is that the 
'obligations or conditions' of employment create the 'zone of special danger' out of 
which the injury arose." [d. Thus, the Court concluded that injuries sustained in the 
course of a reasonable rescue attempt were not necessarily excluded from the coverage 
of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act which authorized payment of com-
pensation for "accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment" 340 U.S. at 506-07, quoting 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1970). 
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ceives an imminent danger to the public, ... his endeavor to alleviate 
the danger should be considered incidental to his employment."17 
Furthermore, the Court indicated that the principles that authorize 
compensation when "the 'obligations or conditions' of employment 
create the 'zone of special danger' out of which the injury arose"18 are 
not limited to cases involvin.g the rescue of identifiable persons in 
imminent danger of harm, or emergency assistance to law enforce-
ment officers effecting an arrest.19 Rather, the Court went on to state 
that such principles are also "applicable to an employee seeking to al-
leviate an immediate danger to the public safety."zo 
Applying the principles underlying the grant of compensation to an 
employee injured in a "zone of special danger" created by the obliga-
tions of his employment to the facts in D'Angeli's Case, the Court up-
held the employee's right to recovery.Z1 The Court determined that 
the employee's travel in the course of his employment brought him 
jnto the position where he encountered the coil on the highway, 
which he reasonably viewed as posing a threat to the public safety.zz 
Thus, the employee's attempt to eliminate that dangerous condition 
was "one of the risks of the employment, an incident of the service, 
foreseeable, if not foreseen, and so covered by the statute."23 Fur-
thermore, the Court agreed with the reviewing board that while the 
employee's action in going out onto Route 93 might have constituted 
poor judgment, it did not amount to "serious and willful misconduct" 
so as to preclude recovery under section 27,24 especially when viewed 
in light of the Board's specific finding that the employee acted in an 
"emergency and dangerous situation."25 
In D'Angeli's Case, the Supreme Judicial Court has considerably ex-
panded the workmen's compensation rights of an employee injured while 
"seeking to alleviate an immediate danger to the public safety."26 The 
Court's decision is a landmark in the developing law applying the Work-
men's Compensation Act to protect workers injured while engaged in ac-
tivities of benefit to others. Previous cases have generally allowed recovery 
where the employee sustained an injury in the course of an activity that 
had some connection with his employment.27 Thus, efforts to rescue 
17 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 589,343 N.E.2d at 371. 
IBId. at 590, 343 N.E.2d at 371, quoting O'uary, 340 U.S. at 507. 
18 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 591, 343 N.E.2d at 371. The Court recognized, however, 
that most cases from other jurisdictions sustaining the employee's right to compensation 
had presented either one or the other of these fact situations. Id. 
10ld. 
IIId. at 590, 343 N.E.2d at 1171. 
IIId. at 591-92,11411 N.E.2d at 1171-72. 
laId. at 592, 11411 N.E.2d at 1\72, quoting Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 
17, 164 N.E. 727, 727 (1928). 
14 G.L. c. 152, § 27. See note 8 supra. See also LocKE.supra note 11, § 2411, at 296-97. 
1& 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 592, 11411 N.E.2d at 1172. 
ISId. at 590, 11411 N.E.2d at 1171. 
17 See Comment, Workmen's Compensation: A Vehicle for Compensating the Good Samaritan, 
24 BUFFALOL. REV. 857, 870 (1975). 
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co-employees,28 or other persons owed some duty by the employer29 
were generally conceded to arise out of and in the course of employ-
ment. Similarly, recovery has generally been allowed for i~uries sus-
tained in an emergency peculiarly associated with the character of the 
employment.3o While these fully accepted cases all predicate recovery 
on establishment of some type of particular work-connection, in 
D'Angeli's Case the Supreme Judicial Court has impliedly accepted the 
so-called "positional-risk" doctrine which would allow compensation to 
an employee for all rescue actions, or even those of good citizenship, 
so long as his employment has brought him to the position from 
which he was moved to act.31 This trend was established in the Su-
preme Court's decision in O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc.,32 relied 
on by the Supreme Judicial Court. While the employee on O'Leary was 
injured in the course of an attempt to rescue an identifiable 
stranger,33 D'Angeli's Case carries this concept further by awarding 
compensation to an employee injured in the course of a reasonable act 
of good citizenship for the protection of the public at large.34 Thus, 
D'Angeli's Case reflects the underlying social policy of workmen's 
28 See, e.g., Peter's Case, 362 Mass. 888, 888, 291 N.E.2d 158, 158-59 (1972) (rescript) 
(upholding award of compensation to an employee who ran in search of police in aid of 
a fellow employee who was assaulted). 
2B E.g., Canavan's Case, 364 Mass. 762, 763, 308 N.E.2d 534, 536 (1974) (rescue ef-
forts to assist strangers on employer's premises); Chapman's Case, 321 Mass. 705, 710, 
75 N.E.2d 433, 436 (1947) (employee departs from regular duties in order to accom-
modate employer's customers); Stilson v. Littlewood, 244 App. Div. 858,279 N.Y.S. 781 
(1935) (per curiam) (hotel cook warns hotel guests on discovering a fire). 
30See, e.g., Egan's Case, 331 Mass. 11, 15, 116 N.E.2d 844, 847 (1954) (upholding 
award of compensation to cabdriver who sustained cerebral hemorrhage resulting from 
fright when called upon by a police officer who was holding three men at bay with a 
gun to go to the police station to get help); LOCKE,supra note 3, § 241, at 293. 
31 Larson, The Positional Risk Doctrine in Workmen's Compensation, 1973 DUKE L.J. 761. 
The "positional risk" principle as formulated by Dean Larson posits that 
[a]n injury 'arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred but for the 
fact that the conditions or obligations of the employment placed [the] claimant in 
the position where he was injured by a neutral force, meaning by "neutral" neither 
personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment. 
32 340 U.S. 504 (1951). See note 16 supra. For subsequent cases employing its analysis, 
see Reilly v. Weber Eng'r Co., 107 N.J. Super. 254, 259-62, 258 A.2d 36, 39-40 (Essex 
County Ct. 1969) (fire captain injured in attempting to rescue child on high tension 
wire whom the captain discovered in the course of investigating an emergency); Ed-
wards v. Louisiana Forestry Comm'n, 221 La. 818, 826, 60 So.2d 449, 451 (1952) 
(Forestry Commission worker stationed in observation tower injured while rushing 
do~n stairway to rescue child being attacked by rabid dog). 
33340 U.S. at 505. See note 16 supra. 
34 See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 589, 343 N .E.2d at 371 ("When a conscientious citizen is 
in the course of his employment and perceives an imminent danger to the public, ... 
his e~,deavor to alleviate the danger should be considered incidental to the employ-
ment. ). 
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compensation-provision of economic security and medical care.35 It 
is certain to be cited in any future case dealing with this topic. 
§3.3. Specific Compensation: Parent's Right to Award for 
Specific Losses Suffered by Minor Son who Died within Twenty-
Four Minutes of Injury: Evidence: Hypothetical Question: Statutory 
Construction. Section 36 of the Massachusetts Workmen's Compen-
sation Act provides "specific compensation" for specified permanent 
handicaps suffered by an injured employee.! From the outset, the 
Massachusetts Act has recognized that certain injuries constitute addi-
tional losses deserving extra payments over and above compensation 
for the loss of earning capacity to which all injured employees are 
entitled.2 Payments under section 36 are not measured by the effect 
of the impairment on the employee's earning capacity.3 Instead, the 
statute specifies a set award for each impairment, which award is not 
related to the employee'S average weekly wage. Recognizing that the 
specific compensation authorized by section 36 is an attempt to com-
pensate the employee for his real loss,4 the Legislature enacted section 
36As to provide that the right to specific compensation shall survive 
the death of the injured employee.6 Section 36A provides: 
In the event that an injured employee who has become entitled to 
compensation under section [36] dies before fully collecting [such 
35 See Comment, Workmen's Compensation: A Vehicle for Compensating the Good Samaritan, 
24 BUFFALO L. REV. 857,874-75 (1975). 
§3.3. 1 G.L. c. 152, § 36. E.g., Loss of vision; loss of hearing; amputations or crip-
pling injuries to hands, feet, arms or legs; disfigurement; loss of bodily functions or 
sense. 
2 Payments under G.L. c. 152, § 36 are explicitly made "in addition to all other com-
pensation." Compensation for total incapacity is provided by § 34. G.L. c. 152, § 34. 
Partial incapacity compensation is awarded under § 35. /d. § 35. 
3 Boynton's Case, 328 Mass. 145, 147, 102 N.E.2d 490, 492 (1951). 
4 Although one factor in the provision of specific compensation is recognition of the 
presumed effect of the permanent handicap on the employee's ability to compete in the 
labor market, its "main purpose to provide more adequate compensation for the 
employee'S real loss, in a system which has taken away [his] common law right of action 
against his employer for personal injuries." L. LOCKE, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 29 
MASS. PRAC. § 345, at 413 (1968) (footnote omitted). 
5 G.L. c. 152, § 36A, as amended through Acts of 1951, c. 494. Provision for the sur-
vival of claims for specific compensation was first made by Acts of 1947, c. 634, § 3, 
which added a paragraph to the end of § 36 as that section appeared in Acts of 1935, c. 
333. Then, by Acts of 1949, c. 519, this paragraph was removed from § 36 and inserted 
. as a separate § 36A, in its present form from the beginning through "dependents," ex-
cept that there was no proviso clause. A 1950 amendment, Acts of 1950, c. 445, 
changed the part relating to the surviving recipients. The section finally assumed its 
present wording by enactment of the Acts of 1951, c. 494. See Henderson's Case, 333 
Mass. 491, 494,131 N.E.2d 925, 926 (1955). 
8 Before the statute specifically made provision for the survival of claims for specific 
compensation, courts held that the right to specific compensation was for the personal 
relief of the injured employee and therefore ceased with his death when it was "dis-
placed" by death benefits awarded under G.L. c. 152, § 31. Cherbury's Case, 251 Mass. 
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compensation], the balance remaining shall become due and pay-
able in a lump sum to his dependents. or if none, to his surviving 
issue, or if no surviving issue, then to surviving parents .... 7 
Section" 36A has been held to authorize specific compensation when 
the claim is filed after the death of an employee who has not himself 
received payments under section 36. In a leading decision, Henderson's 
Case,s the Supreme Judicial Court upheld an award of specific com-
pensation to the widow of an employee who died as the result of his 
injuries without regaining consciousness.9 The Court determined that 
an employee becomes entitled to compensation under section 36, thus 
triggering the rights of his surviving dependents under section 36A, 
as soon as he suffers the injury compensable under section 36.10 The 
insurer, stressing the statutory language which refers to an employee 
who dies "before fully collecting" and makes provision for the pay-
ment of the "balance remaining," had argued that section 36A con-
templates that some payment be made to the employee in his 
lifetimeY Faulting the section for its lack of clarity, 12 the Court, 
nonetheless, concluded "that a reasonable and intelligent purpose to § 
36A must be given by interpreting [the phrases quoted] by the insurer 
as meaning 'any unpaid amount,' " which unpaid amount could be the 
entire sum available as compensation under section 39.13 
Since the decision in Henderson's Case, the Supreme Judicial Court 
has further broadened the rights of claimants under section 36A, 
while at the same time affirming its policy of deference14 to Indusrrial 
397,398-99,146 N.E. 683, 683-84 (1925); Burns's Case, 218 Mass. 8,13,105 N.E. 601, 
603 (1914). 
7 I.n the event that none of these described persons survive the employee, the balance 
shall be paid into the special fund established by Mass. G.L. c. 152, § 65. G.L. c. 152, § 
36A. 
• 333 Mass. 491, 131 N.E.2d 925 (1955). 
• [d. at 495-96, 131 N.E.2d at 927. Among other injuries, the employee suffered a 
rupture of the right eye which would have resulted in its enucleation had he survived 
and would have entitled him to weekly payments of $20 for a period of two hundred 
weeks. /d. at 492. 131 N.E. at 925. See G.L. c. 152, § 36, as appearing in Acts of 1949. c. 
519. No claim was filed on behalf of the employee before his death. 333 Mass. at 492, 
131 N.E. at 925-26. 
10 333 Mass. at 494-95, 131 N.E. at 927 ("One meaning of the word 'entitle' is to give 
a claim to. It seems to us that that is the meaning here and that the reference in § 36A 
is to the time of the happening of the event upon which the employee bases his claim.") 
11 [d. at 495, 131 N.E. at 927. 
12 [d. at 494, 495, 131 N.E. at 926, 927. Furthermore, the Court noted that "[ilf our 
interpretation of [the section] be one unintended by the legislature, a corrective 
amendment may be enacted." [d. 
13 [d. at 495, 131 N.E. at 926. 
14 It has been evident that the board's determination in section 36A cases will be af-
firmed so long as there is medical evidence which would allow the board to determine 
the specific losses of bodily function with which the employee might have been saddled 
had he survived. See Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 1970 ANN, SURV. MASS, LAW § 
20.5, at 517. 
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Accident Board decisions in appeals brought in section 36A cases. 15 
Refusing to draw the distinctions advocated by the insurer, the Court, 
for example, has sustained awards where the employee lived for only 
a few hours after receiving the injury,16 and where the employee has 
not regained consciousnessY Nor has the Court limited recovery to 
cases where the insurer conceded the specific loss or where the medi-
cal end result had obtained before death. IS In keeping with this prac-
tice, the Court, in Bagge's Case,10 upheld an award under section 36A 
after first accepting the Board's conclusion that the testimony of 
claimant's expert in response to hypothetical questions was sufficient 
to establish the nature of the specific losses sustained by the 
employee.2o Furthermore, the Court refused to distinguish between 
cases involving direct injuries to the brain or specific body members 
for which awards are made under section 36 and cases where the 
specific loss results from the operation of a "secondary mechanism," 
such as the deprivatioti. of the blood supply to the brain for a critical 
period of time.u Thus, the Court's sweeping decision in Bagge's Case 
has now defeated the ingenuity of. insurers' counsel in seeking to es-
tablish new lines of defense to claims under section 36A. 
In Bagge's Case, the employee was fatally injured when the raised 
bed of a dump truck he had been working with collapsed, pinning 
him between the bed and the frame. 22 Extricated within minutes, he 
was still conscious, but died before reaching the hospital. 23 An autopsy 
revealed "multiple fractured ribs, probable tear of the great vessels 
around the heart, and hemothorax; that is blood in the chest."24 In 
addition, there were scars across the chest and X-rays indicated that 
his lungs had collapsed.25 
The parents of the decedent received death benefits under section 
.. The flood of appeals reflects the fact that claimants are encouraged to file claims 
under § 36A by the prospect of recovering substantial sums particularly where the em-
ployee has suffered a devastating injury resulting in multiple specific losses compensa-
ble under § 36. 
16 Chin's Case, 357 Mass. 772, 258 N.E.2d 925 (1970) (rescript); Machado's Case, 356 
Mass. 720, 249 N.E.2d 743 (1969) (rescript). See also Morris's Case, 354 Mass. 420, 426, 
238 N.E.2d 35,39 (1968) (Employee already dead on removal from elevator shaft after 
faU. Claim for specific compensation denied for lack of proof, but no question raised as 
to interval between injury and death). 
17 Machado's Case, 356 Mass. 720, 249 N.E.2d 743 (1969) (rescript). 
18 Lauble's Case, 341 Mass. 520, 523-24, 170 N.E.2d 720, 722-23 (1960) (Held: Board 
entided to base its award on physician's testimony with respect to the probability of dis-
figurement and loss of use of legs even if skin grafts were successful). 
18 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3338, 338 N.E.2d 348. 
10/d. at 3344, 338 N.E.2d at 352. 
Itld. at 3348, 338 N.E.2d at 353. 
IIld. at 3339, 338 N.E.2d at 350. 
!ald. 
14/d. at 3342, 338 N.E.2d at 351, quoting testimony of Plymouth County medical ex-
aminer at the hearing before the single member of the Industrial Accident Board. 
IS Id. 
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31 of chapter 152 and then claimed specific compensation under sec-
tions 36 and 36A. The single member of the Industrial Accident 
Board found that the employee, had he lived, would have been enti-
tled to compensation in the amount of $57,375, representing the 
combined awards for total loss of vision in both eyes,26 total loss of 
hearing in both ears,27 total loss of function in both arms and legs,28 
loss of "all other bodily functions,"29 and disfigurement.3o This deci-
sion was affirmed by the reviewing board and sustained by the 
superior court.3! 
In the Supreme Judicial Court,32 the insurer first argued that the 
expert opinion of the claimant's medical witness, given in response to 
a hypothetical question, was impermissible speculation as to the nature 
of the specific losses that the employee would have experienced and 
therefore was insufficient to sustain the finding of the Board.33 The 
Court, however, concluded that its function in passing on the admissi-
bility of expert testimony was limited to answering two inquiries: "(1) 
Was the expert warranted in his conclusion on the basis of direct evi-
dence or inferences reasonably drawn therefrom or from the evidence 
as a whole? and (2) Was the trier of fact warranted in its conclusion 
on the basis of the expert testimony and permissible inferences drawn 
therefrom?"34 After noting that it was not its role to say whether an 
expert's testimony was technically sound as long as the proffered 
opinion was consistent with common sense and free from 
conjecture,35 the Court reviewed the evidence and determined that 
claimant's expert was warranted in concluding that the injuries im-
paired the blood supply to deceased's brain for a critical length of 
time, leading to permanent and near total function and sense losses.36 
In answering the second question, the Court noted that while the 
Board might have been justified, based on all the evidence, in denying 
28 C.L. c. 152, § 36(a). 
27 [d. § 36(f). 
28 [d. §§ 36(t), (q), (n). 
29 [d. § 36(i). 
30 [d. § 36(h). 
31 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3339, 338 N.E.2d at 350. 
32 After the insurer's appeal was entered in the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court, on its own initiative, transferred the case for direct review. C.L. c. 211A, § 10. 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3339,338 N.E.2d at 350. 
33 In particular, the insurer claimed there was no evidence as to when death actually 
occurred or whether the brain had been deprived of oxygen for more than four min-
utes. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3340-41, 338 N.E.2d at 350. 
34[d. at 3343, 338 N.E.2d at 351-52. 
3. [d. at 3344, 338 N.E.2d at 352. 
38 [d. at 3345, 338 N.E.2d at 352. The "evidence as a whole" that formed the basis for 
the claimant's expert's conclusions consisted of a post-mortem X-ray report taken 
shortly after the accident; the testimony of the medical examiner who performed the 
autopsy, as well as of the co-employee and police officer concerning immediate post-
trauma events; direct testimony that the injury caused internal hemorrhaging and col-
lapse of both lungs and that the entire episode involved less than 24 minutes. [d. 
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some of the claims presented,37 it nevertheless would sustain its award 
in keeping with "the well established principle that we must accept the 
board's decision as final if it is supported by the evidence and not 
wrong as a matter of law."38 
Secondly, the insurer sought to distinguish earlier cases sustaining 
awards under section 36A where the employee died shortly after the 
injury as all involving either direct, irreparable injuries to certain limbs 
or sense organs, or direct trauma to the brain or central nervous 
system.39 In Bagge's Case, by contrast, the award was based on expert 
testimony concerning the operation of a "secondary mechan-
ism" -deprivation of the brain's blood supply for a critical period of 
time resulting in irreversible brain damage. For two reasons, however, 
the Court refused to adopt this distinction. First, the Court noted that 
refusing to allow recovery for specific injuries caused by "secondary 
mechanisms" would contravene the precedent of Henderson's Case. 40 In 
Henderson's Case, the Court construed section 36A as allowing recovery 
by the widow of an employee who died as the result of his injuries 
without regaining consciousness despite the Court's recognition that 
this construction created the potential for the incongruous result of 
awarding large sums of specific compensation "for a group of 
miscellaneous injuries resulting in death."41 Secondly, the Court re-
37/d. at 3346, 338 N.E.2d at 352. 
38 Id. at 3344, 3346, 338 N.E.2d at 352. The Court characterized the Board's function 
as that of making findings with respect to the future state of health and bodily function 
of living claimants. /d. at 3345, 338 N.E.2d at 352. Furthermore, the Court noted that 
the Board accomplished this fact finding despite conflicting medical testimony and 
without applying a different rule of evidence in the event of the employee'S intervening 
death. [d. As in earlier cases, the Court attached no significance to the fact that the em-
ployee might not have survived the accident under any circumstances. [d. at 3342 n.5, 
338 N.E.2d at 351 n.5. Papanastassiou's Case, 362 Mass. 91, 94-95, 284 N.E.2d 598, 601 
(1972) (multiple injuries in fatal auto accident); Chin's Case, 357 Mass. 772, 258 N.E.2d 
925 (1970) (multiple injuries in II-story fall). 
39 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3346-47, 338 N.E.2d at 353. See, e.g., Papanastassiou's Case, 
362 Mass. 91, 94-95, 284 N.E.2d 598, 601 (1972); Bosenquet's Case, 353 Mass. 364, 
365,231 N.E. 2d 567, 567-68 (1967). The Court, however, did not dismiss the insurer's 
argument out of hand. Instead, it went so far as to examine the briefs and records of 
the cases involving awards pursuant to section 36A where death followed shortly after 
the injury. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3346, 338 N.E.2d at 353. This examination bore out 
the insurer's contention that the case at bar was distinguishable in some particulars. /d. 
The Court conceded that in those instances where certain limbs or sense organs were 
not themselves irreparably damaged, there had been discernible direct trauma to the 
brain, brainstem, spine or central nervous system. [d. 
The rationale for the distinction advanced by the insurer presumably lies in the rela-
tive certainty with which the Board could find that the employee, had he lived, would 
have sustained a specific loss compensable under § 36 when he had suffered a direct in-
jury to the brain or to limbs or organs specified in the statute. By contrast, when the 
claim is that a "secondary mechanism" has caused a specific loss within the meaning of 
§ 36, the result is necessarily more conjectural, especially when the employee had never 
regained consciousness. 
4. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3347, 338 N.E.2d at 353. 
41 333 Mass. at 495, 131 N.E.2d at 927 (emphasis added). The incongruity stems 
from the potential for awarding specific compensation in situations where the 
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jected the insurer's argument on the grounds that the insurer's sug-
gested demarcation would amount to judicial legislation.42 Neverthe-
less, the Court recognized that recovery under section 36A may de-
pend on arbitrary and illogical factors,43 and again suggested the need 
for possible legislative revision.44 
Bagge's Case, therefore, underscores the Court's policy of deference 
to awards by the Industrial Accident Board whose function in claims 
brought under section 36A is "to find 'as a fact for present award the 
future state of health and bodily function of living claimants.' "45 The 
Court's posture is designed to stem the tide of appeals from Board 
decisions under section 36A,46 as well as to confine the controversy in 
claims brought under that section to where it belongs-before the 
Board. Thus, the Court has indicated that a claimant's right to re-
cover under section 36A should revolve around factual inquiries:47 
Had the injured employee become entitled to compensation for 
specific losses under section 36 before he died? If so, what were the 
losses? Furthermore, the determination of these questions must be 
based on sound factual evidence and the opinion of the medical ex-
employee's death has prevented the parties from ascertaining whether the employee, as 
a matter of fact, suffered specified injuries that would have entitled him to an award of 
specific compensation. Since Henderson's Case, however, the Court has drawn "no dis-
tinction between the Board's function in determining future health where an injured 
employee happens to survive with his injuries and those seemingly rare instances ... 
where he does not survive." Bagge's Case, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3347-48, 338 N.E.2d 
at 353. 
42 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3348, 338 N.E.2d at 353. 
43 Where the employee has died as the result of his injuries, recovery under § 36A is 
likely to turn on the certainty of specific bodily function losses or the sufficiency of the 
medical evidence that formed the basis for the hypothetical expert testimony. See 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3348 n.7, 338 N.E.2d at 353 n.7. Compare Morris's Case, 354 Mass. 
420, 423-24, 238 N.E.2d 35, 37 (1968) with Bagge's Case, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
3344-46, 338 N.E.2d at 351-52. The contrasting results in these two cases may not be 
an occasion for criticism, as suggested by the Court, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3349, 338 
N .E.2d at 354, but rather may demonstrate the discretion of the Board in making fac-
tual distinctions on the basis of the evidence before it. 
.. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3349, 338 N.E.2d at 354. See Henderson's Case, 333 Mass. 
at 494, 495-96, 131 N.E.2d at 926,927. 
45 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3345, 338 N.E.2d at 352, quoting Lauble's Case, 341 Mass. 
520,522, 170 N.E.2d 720, 722 (1960). 
48 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3342 n.5, 338 N.E.2d at 351 n.5, where the Court 
warned: 
Our action in this case should make plain that cases of this nature do not turn on 
such arbitrary matters as the time lapse between injury and death, ... or the fact 
that no autopsy was performed, ... or that medical testimony indicates that the in-
jured employee could not have survived with the injury sustained. 
[d. (citations omitted). 
47 The Court notes that on the three occasions it has upheld denials of § 36A awards, 
it relied on the "uncertainty as to specific bodily function losses or, what is perhaps the 
same thing, insufficiency of the medical evidence on which hypothetical expert tes-
timony was based." [d. at 3348 n.7, 338 N.E.2d at 353 n.7. See Chin's Case, 357 Mass. 
772, 258 N.E.2d 925 (1970); Machado's Case, 356 Mass. 720, 249 N.E.2d 242 (1969); 
Morris's Case, 354 Mass. 420, 426, 238 N.E.2d 35, 39 (.1968). 
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pert must be found to be based on medical probability, and not specu-
lation, conjecture, or surmise. More importantly, the Court has em-
phasized that awards premised on sufficient evidence will not be re-
versed because they contravene nice distinctions of law not expressed 
in the statute.48 Thus, there need be no occasion for further judicial 
appeals on presumed questions of law lurking behind the statutory 
facade. This result, especially in light of the Legislature's failure to 
alter section 36A since it was first criticized by the Court in Henderson's 
Case,49 comports with the policy behind specific compensation of pro-
viding additional payment to compensate the real loss of the 
employee.50 
§3.4. Miscellaneous Decisions. Two cases decided during the 
Survey year clarified an employee's right to workmen's compensation 
for psychoneurosis or anxiety reactions resulting from physical 
trauma. In Hale's Case,l the Appeals Court upheld a finding of per-
manent and total disability on the basis of testimony by the employee's 
psychiatrist that a work-related arm injury had resulted in a psychiat-
ric condition-a depressive reaction which had developed into a con-
dition of paranoia.2 Reviewing the offered medical evidence, the court 
determined that the evidence demonstrated "more than the 'possibility 
or chance of the existence of a causal connection'" between the 
claimant's work experience and medical condition and therefore jus-
tified the finding of compensable disability.3 Similarly, in McEwen's 
Case,4 the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed an Industrial Accident 
Board award of total and permanent incapacity compensation to an 
employee unable to work because of a "psychoneurosis-anxiety reac-
tion" directly attributable to a hand injury he had sustained on his 
job.5 The case was of particular interest since the Court held that the 
claimant had sustained the burden, as required by Foley's Case,6 of 
48 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3348, 338 N.E.2d at 353. See note 45 supra. 
49 333 Mass. at 494, 495, 131 N.E. 2d at 926,927. No bill had been proposed to alter 
the result of Henderson's Case prior to the decision in Bagge's Case. Although such 
failure to file amendatory legislation cannot be construed as indicating satisfaction by 
employers and insurers with the state of the law, it at least is some indication that even 
those interests against whom the trend of decision weighs most heavily concede that it 
accurately reflects the intent of the legislature. 
50 See note 4 supra. 
§3.4. 1 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 76, 340 N.E.2d 921. 
lId. at 76-77, 340 N.E.2d at 922-23. 
3Id. at 77, 340 N.E.2d at 923, quoting Silbovitz's Case, 343 Mass. 372, 374, 178 N.E.2d 
867, 868 (1961), quoting Hachadourian's Case, 340 Mass. 81, 86, 162 N.E.2d 663, 666 
(1959). 
41976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 640, 343 N.E.2d 869. 
• Id. at 642-43, 343 N.E.2d at 871. The Court noted that "we have long since recog-
nized that mental and nervous disorders resulting from physical trauma are compensa-
ble under the Workmen's Compensation Act." Id., citing L. LOCKE, WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION, 29 MASS. PRAC. § 196, at 234 n.79 (1968). 
8358 Mass. 230, 232, 263 N.E.2d 471, 472 (1970). 
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proving that his condition had changed between a prior hearing, 
where he was found not to be permanently and totally disabled,7 and 
the hearing on the present claim.8 In Foley's Case, the Court dismissed 
an employee's claim for permanent and total disability due to the ab-
sence of any "evidence to indicate any change in [his] condition ... 
not due to advancing age" since the prior hearing which had resulted 
in determination of partial incapacity.9 In McEwen's Case, however, 
there was medical testimony that the employee's condition had de-
teriorated because even though his "feelings were similar to those fol-
lowing the accident," they were "made worse because it [was] now 
eleven years later."lo Thus, while advancing age, in the case of a phys-
ical ailment,l1 may be insufficient to sustain the burden of proving a 
change of condition as required by Foley's Case, the passage of time 
may be sufficient to show the requisite deterioration in the case of an 
anxiety-neurosis.l 2 
Another interesting decision-Capozzi's Casel3-involved the appli-
cation of estoppel principles to third party suits under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. The decision, however, has limited significance 
because it will apply only to causes of action arising before January 
12, 1972, the effective date of the 1971 amendments to section 15 of 
chapter 152 of the General Laws. l4 Prior to the amendments, an in-
jured employee was required to elect between an action at law against 
the third party and a compensation claim brought under the Act.ll> In 
Capozzi's Case, the Appeals Court applied estoppel to soften the rigors 
of the procedural requirements that section 15, prior to the amend-
7 At a hearing that ended on April 17, 1970, a single member of the Board denied 
the employee's claim on the ground that he had failed to sustain the burden of proving 
that he was totally and permanently disabled as required by G.L. c. 152, § 34A. This 
decision was affirmed by the full Board, although both the single member and the 
Board reserved the question of the employee's rights for compensation after April 17, 
1970. The employee did not appeal this decision, but instead filed another claim for 
disability benefits, under section 34A, dating from April 17, 1970. A single member ul-
timately awarded him total and permanent incapacity compensation in a decision, dated 
May 30, 1972, which decision was the subject of the present appeal. 1976 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 642, 343 N.E.2d at 871. 
8 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 643, 343 N.E.2d at 871. 
9358 Mass. at 232,263 N.E.2d at 472. 
10 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 644, 343 N.E.2d at 871. 
11 In Foley's Case, for example, the employee had suffered an injury to his right 
shoulder and arm. 358 Mass. at 231,263 N.E.2d at 471. 
12 In McEwen's Case, the physical effects of the employee's initial hand injury had dis-
appeared, but he continued to suffer from a condition diagnosed as "psychoneurosis-
anxiety reaction" whose symptoms were lightheadedness, dizziness, weakness in the legs, 
nervousness, and tenseness. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 641, 343 N.E.2d at 870-71. At the 
second hearing, the doctor testified that the employee's feelings were "only made worse 
because it is now eleven years later" and that the last several years had witnessed a 
"hint" of a worsening condition based on the employee'S "discouragement, low morale 
and feelings of not being much good." [d. at 644, 343 N.E.2d at 871-72. 
13 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 641, 347 N.E.2d 685. 
14 Acts of 1971, c. 888, § 1 and c. 941, § 1. 
15 G.L. c. 152, § 15, as in effect prior to Acts of 1971, c. 888, § 1 and c. 941, § 1. 
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ments, had imposed on an employee who initially elected to pursue 
his third party action, but subsequently decided to abandon that ac-
tion in favor of his compensation remedy. The former version of sec-
tion 15 allowed the employee to avoid that election only by a formal 
discontinuance of his action at law. l6 In Capozzi's Case, however, the 
employee had not discontinued the third party action because the 
self-insurer had urged the claimant not to do so "since the Statute of 
Limitations will very shortly run, and you will run a substantial risk of 
prejudicing the self-insurer's third party's [sic] rights under sections 
15 and 18, which could well prove an absolute defense to your com-
pensation claim."l7 Noting that there were no cases either explicitly 
permitting or precluding the assertion of an estoppel in these Clrcum-
stances, the court affirmed the Industrial Accident Board's conclusion 
that the self-insurer should be estopped from asserting the discon-
tinuance requirement. ls The court distinguished Broderick's Case l9 
where the employee had not attempted to discontinue his action at 
law until almost a year after the running of the statute of limitations. 
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the purposes of section IS-to 
compel the employee's election of remedies and to preserve the cause 
of action against the third party for the benefit of the 
insurer2°-would not be defeated by the application of estoppel when 
an employee's attempt to choose his compensation rem·edy by discon-
tinuing his tort action was thwarted only by the insistence of the 
self-insurer.21 
In LeBlanc's Case, 22 the Appeals Court reviewed a decision of the 
superior court involving the computation of the employee's average 
weekly wage for compensation purposes. The court concluded that the 
evidence, as a matter of law, did not support the single member of the 
Industrial Accident Board's finding of $45 a week for tips as an incre-
ment of the employee's average weekly wage.23 The court concluded, 
however, that the judge erred in denying the emplo}\ee's motion for re-
committal to the Board for further findings of fact ~ith respect to the 
average weekly wage.24 
In Flaherty v. The Travelers Insurance CO.,25 the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that a truck driver who was entitled to payment of benefits 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act was precluded from personal 
16Id. 
17 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 642, 347 N.E.2d at 687 (quoting from a letter to 
the claimant from an attorney for the self-insurer). 
18 Id. at 644-45, 647, 650, 347 N.E.2d at 687-88, 689. 
19 320 Mass. 149,67 N.E.2d 897 (1946). 
'0 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 646, 347 N.E.2d at 688, citing Furlong v. Cronan, 
305 Mass. 464, 468,26 N.E.2d 382, 385 (1940). 
21 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 646,347 N.E.2d at 688. 
22 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1368,338 N.E.2d 365. 
23Id. at 1368, 338 N.E.2d at 365 . 
•• Id. 
2S 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100,340 N.E.2d 888. 
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lllJury protection ("no-fault" or PIP) benefits from the insurer of the 
truck that he was operating when it overturned on the highway.26 The 
employee's average weekly wage on the day of the injury was $220 per 
week, and he was out of work for eight and one-half weeks. He re-
ceived incapacity compensation benefits of $95 per week, whereas his 
PIP benefits would have been 75 percent of his average weekly wages.27 
The plaintiff sought PIP benefits up to the 75 percent maximum in-
cluding the payments previously received from workmen's 
compensation.28 The Court, however, concluded that section 34A of 
chapter 90 of the General Laws removed entirely from the class of in-
jured persons entitled to protection under section 24A any person enti-
tled to workmen's compensation benefits. 29 
26/d. at 100, 340 N.E.2d at 889. 
27 C.L. C. 90, § 34A. 
28 The claimant argued that the language in C.L. c. 90, § 34A that refers to 
workmen's compensation benefits was designed only to prevent double recovery of 
"medical expenses incurred" and therefore did not preclude the injured party's right to 
reimbursement of wages up to 75% of his weekly wage. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 102-04, 
340 N.E.2d at 890-91. 
29 [d. at 104, 340 N.E.2d at 891. 
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